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SUGGESTIONS
NATURAL

FOR

CLARIFYING

LAW

Jacques Leclercq

at first blush, to be no concept more traditional, more
stable, or more solidly established than that of natural law. Its history has
been written a score of times, and shows it to be as old as the notions of
human rights and dignity. Perhaps in the Orient, where men have always
lived under despotic regimes, there is no such notion, at least in the main
streams of thought. Yet, whenever a historian looks closely enough at any
culture, he is likely to find some trace of almost any human institution.
Man is everywhere himself; circumstances may vary, but nature persists. A
French proverb puts it: "Chassez le naturel: il revient au galop." Herein
lies the foundation of natural law. Wherever we begin, we come upon
our subject.
In any event, it is in Greece that we ordinarily fix the point of departure
of the natural law, because the literature and thought of Greece more than
those of any other ancient people celebrated the dignity of man. From Greece
the idea passed to Rome, where it was taken up by the Jurists. The Romans
are usually considered the founders of law, although this is debatable. Science
is a formidable instrument because it breaks down almost all simple assumptions. It is true that those which remain are only the more certain; but the
average man likes to have a good many convictions, to be sure of almost
everything. As one develops the scientific spirit it becomes increasingly apparent that one can be sure of only a few things and must check painstakingly to be sure of them.
I have just spoken of the tradition which makes the Romans the founders
of law. Obviously in order to know if the Romans are the founders of law
we should first know what law is. This no one knows very clearly. It gives
rise to esoteric discussions, of which we have already had an intimation in
the first issue of the NATURAL LAW FORUM. Every class of specialists concerned with law has its own conception of what law is. The law specialists
par excellence, those who are held and hold themselves to have exclusive
competence, are the jurists. Even the name they bear indicates that law
is regarded as their especial concern. But many others also treat of the
law, such as moralists and philosophers. For instance, Kant's conception of
law is often spoken of, and Kant was no jurist. Here we encounter a
THERE WOULD SEEM,
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phenomenon which the sociology of science ought to study. It has not done
so until now, as far as I know, because sociology is still an embryonic science.
Scientific development is achieved in part by the formation of hermetic
scientific groups, whose members live by themselves, communicating very
little with the outer world and forming among themselves a technical apparatus of ideas and classifications which they are often alone in comprehending. Moreover, many of them are satisfied not to be understood, because
that gives them a feeling of being superior to the ordinary run of humanity.
This is a moral aspect of the problem. Man is vain, and vanity is a moral
defect. And scientists are like other men.
I know that there is a tendency nowadays to react against this specialization and that there are being formed institutes which attempt to synthesize,
forums where specialists of different sciences may meet. But the situation
is difficult. Since we have been speaking of sociology, let us take sociology
as an example. It would seem that of all the sciences, this deals with the
subject matter of the broadest interest, and should therefore speak the most
ordinary language. Yet the sociological journals abound in articles incomprehensible to the uninitiated reader.
The scientific disciplines, then, are cut off from each other, even when they
deal with the same subject matter. They are separated by language, technique, a whole methodology. This difference of technical approach is a
product of the development of distinct groups without mutual rapport. This
is a human phenomenon, and a fundamental one. The sociologist calls it
"vertical stratification," a very simple term in his vocabulary, although quite
meaningless to the outsider.
Returning, then, to the subject of law, we are confronted by three or
four groups almost completely isolated from one another. First we have
the jurists--law teachers, lawyers, and judges; then the moralists, whose
concern with another approach to rules of human activity leads them to
concern themselves with law; then again the. philosophers, who attempt to
establish a general synthesis of all departments of knowledge, including, of
course, law. Nowadays it is necessary to add to this list the sociologists.
They publish studies on the sociology of law, and their law seems very
unlike that of the jurists.
For all these groups, a favorite topic is natural law. It should not be
surprising, therefore, to find diverse and rather confusing notions on the
subject. In this paper will be found general reflections inspired by the reading and thinking I have done on the subject for more than thirty years.
There will be few references to individual authors, because we are dealing
with ideas that recur constantly from generation to generation. To me it
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seems more useful to seek out solutions than to search for the exact nuance
of thought of this man or that.
quately carried out by others.

1.
THE HISTORY of

This latter work, moreover, is being ade-

HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

natural law shows it standing at the junction of law and

morality and raising the question of the relation of the two.
From ancient Greece until the nineteenth century, the idea of natural law
appears as a river majestic in its course, flowing peacefully in a great valley.
Historians think that the idea of natural law goes back to Heraclitus, in the
sixth century B.c., because Heraclitus opposes the v4 o9 to the On5019. This
means simply that, discerning order in the universe, he argues that man should
in his individual life (morality) and his social life (natural law) make his
actions harmonize with that order. In this view, then, natural law is the
group of principles which a man ought to observe in his social life.
This idea recurs often in the history of philosophy. Natural law thus conceived is, as it were, the rule of good government. Thus, it is urged chiefly
against unjust governments; it is the voice of the opposition, the recourse
of the weak. Commonly cited as one of its earliest affirmations, is the tirade
of Sophocles' Antigone. Forbidden to bury her brother, she sets in opposition to the tyrant "the divine decrees, the unwritten and immutable laws."
"They are neither of today nor of yesterday," she says; "no one knows from
what distant past they spring."
Rulers generally do not care for the natural law because it is rarely
invoked save in opposing their will. Thus, under the German conception,
which triumphed in Nazism, talk of the natural law was suppressed. This
conception-that there is no source of law other than the will of the Fiihrer
-is traditional in despotic governments. It is told of Haroun al-Rashid,
celebrated as the exemplar of Moslem rulers, that on a number of occasions
he had brought to him in a sack the head of some man against whom he
supposed himself to have cause for complaint. We find another very characteristic example in the story of Esther. Ahasuerus, king of Persia, is
angry with his minister Haman, and Haman is put to death. There is no
question of juridical forms, of right of defense, or of anything of the kind.
The will of the despot is all that is necessary. Moreover, the Biblical narration presents this tradition as normal, and in the case of the Book of Esther,

it is described with approval because the story terminates happily for the
Jews. This despotism is standard in the Eastern countries of antiquity, and
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in the Moslem world almost down to the present day. Nazism was a return
to what has always been done in the Orient; but it seemed monstrous in
the West, because we have a different tradition.
To return to Antigone, the laws of which she speaks are clearly moral
laws, presented as superior to rulers. Here already a term appears which
will be a source of confusion, since the word "law" can be used in either
a moral or a juridical sense. We speak of "moral laws" and we speak also
of "positive laws" or commands of a ruler. If we add that until recently
most juridical laws were traditional laws, not established by a ruler and for
the most part unwritten, yet recognized by rulers and taken as a basis for
the conduct of government, we can see that the problem is very complicated
indeed. This notion of unwritten traditional law persists in the common law
system of the Anglo-Saxon countries, and we find traces of it in other
systems as well. If we wish to identify law with the expressed will of a
lawmaker, this kind of law which is recognized by the ruler but not created
by him raises many difficulties. It is on questions like this that specialists
devote themselves to subtle intellectual manipulations that give their wit
free rein.
Antigone's idea of a natural "law" superior to the positive law reappears throughout Western history. In late antiquity, the Stoics insisted on
the idea that men have rights and duties independent of positive laws, that
these rights and duties are founded on a justice which governs human
relationships, and that positive law must be just if it is to be binding in
conscience. Cicero, the chief witness of the Stoic tradition in his time,
develops these ideas at considerable length. Thus is formed the notion of
natural law, founded not on the opinions or will of men, but on nature,
and prevailing over the positive law established by peoples in their institutions. "The greatest of absurdities," says Cicero, "is to regard all the laws
or institutions of nations as just."' This natural law inheres in us from birth;
it can be neither superseded nor annulled. It is to this law that the weak
appeal against the injustice of the strong.
It is true that there have always been skeptics who take issue with these
principles and admit of no social regulation other than the will of rulers.
They are to be found among the sophists, who aroused such indignation in
Socrates and Plato. But these skeptics seem to be whimsical men who swim
against the stream. Most moralists and jurists adhere to the natural law.
The skeptical tradition reappears in the West after the Renaissance
with the advent of the materialist philosophers. In England it is identified
1. De Legibus, 1.1.15.
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with Hobbes, who admits of no foundation for law except the will of the
Prince. Because of this theme, this concept of law has been described as
a "will theory" of law. It persists through the centuries shifting from Prince
to Parliament its focus of arbitrary power and expresses itself in the wellknown adage that "Parliament can do anything it pleases except make a
man a woman." It is true that in Western thought this idea must be taken
with reservations, because it is offset by a parallel tradition concerning the
rights of man, and because no one could imagine Parliament deciding to
have half or even a tenth of the English beheaded. Nevertheless, this maxim,
like the equally famous "My country, right or wrong," expresses a reaction
against the system of natural law, which constantly opposes a moral law to
the will of the legislator. A similar current in legal thinking is represented
by the German voluntarist theory of law and the state, which developed
during the nineteenth century and had its culmination in Nazism.
In our consideration of the natural law, then, we must not forget that
there is in Western thought a rival tradition. With this in mind, let us
proceed with our review of the natural law tradition.
As we have seen, this tradition was among the ancients a matter of moral
principles-of principles governing human conduct. Law is founded on
morality; its end is to give force to morality and to help men put moral
principles into practice.
This conception naturally became integrated with Christian thought.
In the Middle Ages, when the great syntheses of Christian thought appear,
natural law takes its place in the moral scheme under the title of justice;
it is nothing other than the moral law insofar as it applies to social relations.
Thus the distinction between natural law and morality is not very clear-cut,
and no great effort is made to point out the difference. St. Thomas' treatise
on laws is fairly characteristic, from this point of view: he discerns eternal
law, natural law, positive divine law, and positive human law; relates all
these laws to a single definition; and emphasizes more what unites them than
what distinguishes them.
From this line of thought there developed in the Catholic schools a
tradition which related natural law to morality. Catholic treatises on natural
law, the work of moralists and theologians, begin with a study of basic or
general morality from which natural law is deduced. The latter is often
treated under the name of "special morality." The object of law is justice,
and positive law has the establishment of justice as its special end. Natural
law is that group of general principles we look to in this effort to establish
justice.
Let us note in passing that St. Thomas is writing a treatise on leges,
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not a treatise on jus. The natural law he speaks of is purely a body of
precepts, without that element of embodiment in a social organization that
is essential to law in the juridical sense. But natural law thus understood
is no more than moral law considered as emanating from nature-moral
law in its broadest aspect. On the other hand, when St. Thomas comes to
speak of positive human law he is using law in the juridical sense. In the
scheme thus presented, is there a place for a juridical natural law? This
would be different from St. Thomas' natural law, which, as we have just
seen, is moral and not juridical. Is it, then, some other and more particularized form of morality, perhaps that which deals with the duties of man
in society? If so, can it properly be called law at all? To answer this question
fully, we must know better than we do what it is that jurists understand
by law. Suffice it to say that if law is not the same as morality and natural
law is the same as morality, it must follow that natural law is not law, and
we should give it a different name.
This would mean that the writers who call natural law "special morality"
are right, although this is a rather vague term; there could be other special
moralities. Shall we not say instead, "social morality"? Occasionally there
is a mention of social morality; but like all such terms, it is used without
much attempt at precision. We shall have to return to the problem of terminology. Meanwhile, we can point out the problems as they present themselves.
To return to our historical account, we have seen that natural law, as it
persists even today in the tradition handed down from the Middle Ages, is
bound up with morality. But with the Renaissance there begins a new
tradition which separates the two. This tradition, it seems to me, is the
product of a cleavage between the jurists and the moralists.
The doctrine of natural law in the Middle Ages is the work of Catholics,
religious and theologians. The moralists who represent the continuing
Catholic tradition in our time are similarly churchmen and theologians. On
the other hand, Grotius, the seventeenth century Dutchman, whom many
writers present as the "father of natural law," is a Protestant, a layman,
and a jurist. Pufendorf and Thomasius, the two German jurists usually
cited as the seventeenth century heirs of Grotius, are again Protestant laymen.
The Reformation has cut Christianity in two; natural law separated from
morality is the work of lay Protestant jurists. Theological preoccupations
do not concern these men. The intellectual atmosphere in which they live
is entirely different from that of the medieval writers. Grotius is not merely
the father of natural law; he is also considered the founder of international
law. Whereas for the medieval writers natural law is the culmination of a
system based on metaphysics, natural law for these men is the point of

NATURAL LAW FORUM

departure of the law of nations. They are interested not in tracing it back
to its source, but in developing their doctrines from it.
Thus they do not concern themselves with individual morality. Their
interest is in discerning an appropriate foundation for law in the field of
international relations, where there is no recognized source of positive law.
The only principles that hold their attention are those which can be shown
to be at the basis of law, in other words, those which find application in
social life. For these men there can be no positive law between states,
because the State or Prince has the sovereign power. In its place they put
the "law of nations," a group of principles they regard as self-evident and
universally admitted.
With the passing of the Middle Ages, jurists can no longer draw inspiration from a view in which natural concepts are integrated into the framework of a Christian community. Left to themselves, they can only resort to
moral principles universally admitted or believed by them to be such. They
are on the way to that self-evident natural law, written in the hearts of man,
which will be professed almost universally until the middle of the nineteenth
century. We cannot help seeing a certain naivet6 in their insistence that
these principles are self-evident. But they are forced to declare them so,
because otherwise they would have to prove them. Such proof would be a
long and arduous process; and these jurists, as pioneers in the field of international law, have already undertaken the work of several lifetimes.
Why do they not look for a solution in a division of labor whereby
specialists in natural law would make their conclusions available to their
confreres? Evidently because the only specialists on the subject are Catholic
theologians, and the writers of whom we speak are Protestant jurists. Contact
has been broken off, even though these men know something of the Catholic
tradition and occasionally cite Catholic writers. Moreover, even in the
Catholic Church, there is no group which deals with natural law in and for
itself. The traditional medieval doctrine is simply the culmination of a system
of morality which in turn depends upon a philosophico-theological
system. Thus, we are at an impasse. The only practical way to extricate ourselves from it is to assert that we are taking for our basis a
self-evident natural law.
I speak here of a "practical" way. This bears on a point which should
never be forgotten in the history of philosophy. Sometimes it is thought that
the philosopher lives in a state of pure abstraction, wholly given over to his
own thought. Actually the philosopher is, like all men, a part of a social
milieu, which imposes on him a certain number of assumptions. These he
will probably treat as self-evident, feeling that it would be ridiculous to deny
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them. Philosophers are not ordinarily unlike other men, except as regards
the precise object of their speculations.
The term "ridiculous" just used indicates that we are dealing with an
affective evaluation, a sentiment. It points up the role of sentiment in
philosophy. We should like some day to see a psychologist or sociologist
publish a factual study of this role; but such a work will not be forthcoming
for a long time, for philosophers are generally little interested in psychology
and sociology, and psychologists and sociologists know almost nothing of
philosophy.
Add to this the fact that all life is built on certain self-evident principles
which cannot be put in question without undermining the foundations of
life. This fact predisposes our jurists, Grotius and the rest, who need
principles on which to build their law of nations, to look for principles they
can regard as self-evident. They assure themselves thereby of a solid grounding
for their legal doctrines.
But where does one turn to seek these self-evident principles? In the
social milieu. Those principles will be declared self-evident which are taken
as such in that milieu-as for example, the legitimacy and sacred character
of the family, of property, of the State.
At this point scholars begin also to distinguish between natural law and
morality, and occasionally to oppose them to each other. When the French
Revolutionists proclaim the "Rights of Man," they have no idea of stating
principles of morality. None the less they are certainly dealing with natural
rights which are independent of and superior to the will of the lawmaker.
The idea is like the ancient one, but cut loose from the structure of morality.
It is followed up with confused explanations of the difference between natural
law and morality.
Until the nineteenth century, the doctrine of natural law develops as if
by a process of spontaneous growth. But in the middle of that century comes
the eruption of positivism, which claims to do away with natural law. The
partisans of natural law are at first disoriented. They continue to insist that
their principles are self-evident, and the positivists laugh them to scorn. This
is all to the good; it is necessary that the old ramparts fall with the solemn
doctors of the old natural law, so that a new school, setting forth a rejuvenated
conception, may arise. In the twentieth century we begin again to speak of
natural law, but in relatively new terms. Positivism has brought many to
one conclusion: natural law is not indisputably self-evident.
The still growing positivist movement in our day finds its chief expression
in sociology-not among all sociologists, to be sure, but among those who
think that the question of abstract truth is not one with which men can
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profitably concern themselves, and that men should instead be content to
study and deal with social phenomena, their origin, development, and results,
in order to perfect the techniques of social existence.
With the sociologists we find the same thing we found with the jurists
and the moralists---they form a closed corporation. The function of sociology
is not to look for philosophical explanations; it is to examine and correlate
facts in such a way as to achieve a systematized interpretation of them on
the factual level. Since the sociologist lives within this context, conversing
on nothing else with his peers, and since his achievements in it afford him
deep satisfaction-especially since his point of view is a new one and produces
considerations undreamed of in the past-he quite naturally concludes that
there are no other considerations to be explored. It is a fairly natural defect
of the human mind to suppose that the questions which absorb it are the only
important ones, and even, sometimes, that they exhaust reality. This defect
springs from the fact that the human mind is not very vigorous. That is
the human condition; we have to take it as it is.
It is in the world of the jurists that new conceptions of natural law have
developed in this century. The Catholic theologian-moralists limit themselves in general to the repetition of Scholastic doctrine without any signal
effort to discern its significance. The jurists generally know little of the
theologian-moralists, and vice versa. Again the closed corporation.
It is true that conditions are tending to change. We have seen that a
need for synthesis is making itself felt among the more advanced scholars.
A certain number of young jurists are beginning to realize that sociology
exists; also a twentieth-century renascence of speculative philosophy is beginning to make its mark here and there. But as Rene Th~ry brought out in
relation to France in the first number of this FORUM, these are exceptional
cases.
Despite the enormous development of the positive sciences, the twentieth
century ushers in a rebirth of natural law thinking among the jurists. A growing number of these men come to see that it is impossible to establish law
without a certain number of guiding principles. But what can these guiding
principles be? They cannot be law itself, if law is to be established from them.
What can they be if not the natural law? But how are they different from
morality?
We are back to our old question. The first impetus of positivism, and
the still active positivist spirit, rendered a service to the natural law by making
impossible the provincial attitude of the old-time writers who spoke of a selfevident natural law, embodying all the principles that happened to be accepted
by their society. Today the defenders of natural law are more discreet. Some
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are very timid indeed. We shall discuss this later; for the moment let us try
to clarify the distinction between law and morality and determine whether
natural law is really law.
II.

NATURAL

LAW

AND

MORALITY

finds its embodiment in law. To determine what it is, we
must begin with law. Law is the set of rules which govern social organization.
This is not offered as a perfect or complete definition; entire books have
been devoted to the search for such a definition. This is intended simply
as a rule of thumb to orient our discussion. We will not consider here what
power can establish law, or what is the boundary between legal and nonlegal rules.
Law is only one of several disciplines which deal with social life. Social
philosophy seeks general principles of social life; political science studies the
application of these principles; law establishes rules for social life; sociology
investigates social phenomena. To give an example: on the subject of labor,
social philosophy will provide the principle that human society should be
regarded as a community of equals; political science will seek to promote
equality in the particular situation by some such device as the organization
of labor unions; law will provide for the establishment of such unions, and
fix their rights and duties; sociology will study how they in fact develop
and operate.
We say that law fixes rules; at the same time we say that it consists of
rules. It has then a series of aspects. The proper and primary meaning of
law is existing rules. When we say that law establishes rules, we should
really say that men establish rules which are called law. The science which
studies law is also called law, but this is a derived meaning. Law is, then,
in its basic sense, a social reality, a group of rules governing social life.
Morality, on the other hand, is essentially concerned with the individual.
It determines the rules by which he may attain his perfect development or
his end. Even when it deals with relations between men, it does so from the
point of view of the individual.
Law, which seeks to order society so that men may be happy and may
be free to develop, and morality, which sets the direction man's development
must take, are constantly meeting and intersecting one another, and borrowing from one another. Both are normative sciences which regulate human
activity, and we pass continually from one to the other. Morality forbids
lying, and law requires good faith in the formation of contracts. Morality
forbids homicide and stealing; law punishes them. Law refuses to sanction
NATURAL LAW
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agreements contrary to good morals; morality determines what agreements
are included in this principle. Morality calls for obedience to legitimate
governments, and law tells which governments are legitimate. In all these
examples, the law involved is the positive law. But what of natural law?
Wherein does it partake of the nature of law? Can we find scope for it
between law and morality?
All these questions will seem idle to the reader who is not a specialist
in the subject. Most people live in a state of intellectual confusion and are
quite content to do so. As something of a specialist in the natural law,
I am constantly confronted with statements about natural law in the sense
of morality. People ask me, for instance, if natural law forbids drunkenness
and stealing. The term "natural law" is currently fashionable, especially
among Catholics who seek a rallying point against relativism. There are,
therefore, many people fond of using it, and they bring it up on any pretext,
as other men use the term "sociology."
But it may be useful for some specialists to try to find out what they
are talking about. People usually are amused at the spectacle of those
Byzantine theologians who were discussing the sex of angels at the moment
when the Turks were besieging the city; but the question does have a certain
theological importance, and we could equally well admire the detachment
of these men of learning who continued to reflect on their problems in the
midst of social upheavals. We might also add that most of them would
probably not have distinguished themselves in military service. Similarly,
boxers and football stars will perhaps dismiss my speculations as insignificant;
but, aside from the fact that I can neither box nor play football, it is possible that my modest work may have a social utility as great as theirs.
But to return to our question: to determine whether natural law is
really law we must clarify not only the nature of law but also that of morality.
Now morality is a rather disconcerting science: on the one hand, it is universal-it applies to all of life; on the other, it lacks a subject matter of its
own-we cannot point to acts which are exclusively moral. Actually, morality
is the viewing af all acts from a particular perspective, and that perspective

is liberty.
Morality deals with the rules for free activity, with the way a man should
use his freedom in the governing of his life. An act takes on a moral character
when it is freely accomplished. Every free act has a moral character; every
act which is not free does not. The problem of free will is thus in a way
the key problem of morality.
In the study of morality we encounter the notion of "good," a universal
which appears also in other contexts. In addition to "moral good" there
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is "good-in-itself," ontological or metaphysical, which tradition defines as
a transcendental property of being, a property possessed by whatever has
being. When we call a machine a good machine, or a fruit a good fruit,
we are not passing a moral judgment but are using good in this latter sense.
Since morality concerns itself with the free activity of men, moral good
is ontological goodness, or good-in-itself, insofar as it becomes an object of
man's free activity. A good machine is not a moral value; but as a man
applies his free activity to construct such a machine, his act takes on moral
value. When we say that morality is objective, we are saying that it applies
to an object, that is, that the value of the object, which is not moral, determines the value of the free act, which is moral.
Let us take any technique, for example that of architecture, which makes
possible the construction of comfortable, safe, and esthetically pleasing houses.
Morality will say that the architect is obliged to respect the rules of this
technique. And that principle applies to all human action. Architecture
is not morality; but morality commands us to respect the laws of architecture.
Law is a technique also. It establishes rules which enable men to live
well together. It is often said that law is the set of rules governing social life;
this is usually the first definition which comes to mind. But we can now
refine this definition by stating that law is a set of rules for achieving the
good of men through society; in other words, for determining what things
should be imposed or allowed so that men may find in society the means
of development which it is society's object to afford.
There may be mention of "social utility" or "social order" or "common
good" as objects of law. But these terms are equivocal. If law aims in the
last analysis at the common good, a particular rule of law can still be established for the profit of a group, a class, a family, even an individual. But
insofar as there is a rule, the individual will be involved only as representing
a category of citizens. For example, the rule of law which applies to the
President of the Republic, applies to only one man, but it is at the same time
a general rule, applying to every man who finds himself in this position.
Such a rule of law can protect a minority at the expense of the whole
community, as is the case when laws are established in favor of a national
minority. Similarly, when laws are made for the protection of workers, what
inspires them is not the good of the whole community as such but the good
of a class and an ideal of justice, which requires the whole community to
fulfill its function in regard to this class by safeguarding the rights of the
latter; in other words, by permitting it to develop humanly through institutions established for its benefit.
It is true that the good of the whole community is still served indirectly
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in that every member can rely on the community to take those measures
most favorable to his own development. Thus, the true common good does
not exclude measures whose immediate aim is the good of a particular class.
The good involved here is not a moral good, as can be seen from an
example. Catholic moralists, who analyze moral problems more exhaustively
than others do, distinguish between the obligation in conscience, which is
properly a moral obligation, and the juridical obligation, which is created
by law. When, for example, we establish universal suffrage, which is a
juridical rule, we may make it simply a right or we may make voting
obligatory. But in either case the moralist will ask if the citizen is bound
in conscience to vote-if he is morally at fault for not voting. What the
jurist asks is whether universal suffrage should be established and how it
should be organized. In one way the two perspectives are the same, for the
establishment of the juridical rule may be a moral duty for those who
govern. But this is no different from the duty of the architect to apply the
techniques of architecture.
The distinction between the question of what social rule to establish and
the problem of the obligation or licitness of a given action is what makes
morality and law two different disciplines, even though the objects of the
two are related. We cannot determine juridical good without first ascertaining
what man's good is; and since man cannot develop except in society, we
cannot know his good without taking into account the social needs of his
nature. The moralist, then, should consider social good, and the jurist moral
good. But the perspectives of both remain separate, and that difference of
perspective results in a difference of mind. The jurist is above all interested
in social good, in rules to be observed in view of that good; the moralist
is preoccupied with the good of the individual. It is fitting that each should
deepen his studies in the direction indicated by his proper discipline, as long
as he does not wall himself in, as long as the jurist turns to morality when
the idea of moral good becomes relevant, and the moralist turns to law
when he comes upon a question of social good.
Natural law, it must be added, has properly an institutional sense. As
the group of principles of social order which proceed from the nature of
man, it should serve as a foundation for positive law. Since the good it
seeks is a social good, it partakes of the nature of law and it is something
other than morality.
After all the discussions of our day we begin to realize that the law to
which the ancients appealed against unjust enactments of human authority,
the one found in Sophocles and Cicero, was not natural law but morality.
When Antigone opposes the rights of conscience to the tyrant's decree and
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speaks of eternal laws, she is talking of moral laws. She is no more concerned
with natural law than is Maria Goretti when she dies in defense of her
chastity. Maria Goretti is a martyr to purity, not to natural law.
The aim of natural law is to seek out those principles stemming from
the nature of man which should form the basis of the positive law. To take
an example highly relevant to morality, so that we may not shirk our difficulty,
let us consider the "right of revolution." May citizens revolt against unjust
governments? What means can they or should they employ? The question
to which natural law should address itself is whether and in what way this
right to revolt is conducive to the social good. This right may be recognized
by positive law. Magna Charta in England and several medieval charters
in other countries recognized the right of the subject to revolt if the Prince
was not fulfilling the obligations he had taken on.
This is a question of social organization, and therefore one of law. Elsewhere morality teaches that one must follow the rules laid down by natural
law, just as it teaches that the architect should build well by conforming
to the technique of building.
In this question of the right of revolution, we may see very clearly how
the two disciplines of morality and law are related. The individual who
wonders if he has the right to revolt may consult a moralist. If the unfortunate Antigone had been Catholic, she could have consulted her confessor
and thereby received great comfort. But when it comes to ascertaining how
the right of revolution occurs in social life-that is, what one might wish
to see incorporated into positive law-we are faced with a question of natural
law. I have already remarked on this: we are continually passing from law
to morality, and vice versa. The two cannot be isolated from one another,
for they have many questions in common. But their difference of perspective makes it extremely important not to confuse them.
The most usual, meeting point of natural law and morality is in social
morality, the branch of morality which investigates the rights and duties of
men qua members of society. In social morality law is constantly referred
to; but the aim is still to establish a line of conduct for the individual rather
than to determine how society should be organized. Thus, natural law must
be distinguished from social morality.
Social philosophy, like morality, might seem at first blush to be identical
with natural law. Looking more closely, however, we can see that this is
not the case. Social philosophy considers the conditions and the essence of
social life as a whole. Law is only one of the manifestations of social life.
In a study of social philosophy there might be a chapter devoted to law,
to determine the place law has in social life and to study the character of
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law in order to see what differentiates it from other manifestations of social
life; but this would be only a chapter. The question of natural law-that
is, of the principles which should animate all law-is a particular question
which social philosophy may take up but not embrace as its proper object.
Lastly, there is the philosophy of law. It is rather difficult to determine
what this is, since writers on the subject are not in agreement. In most
cases, however, it consists of a kind of profound reflection-the word philosophy means "profound reflection"-on positive law. Again we are not
dealing with natural law. That law remains uniquely itself.
Let us attempt then to understand the words we are using. Morality is
the set of rules governing individual conduct; law is the set of rules governing
social organization. Social morality is morality because it deals with the
conduct of the individual man in society; natural law is law because it deals
with natural principles governing social organization. Social philosophy is
a profound reflection on social life as a whole; the philosophy of law is a
profound reflection on law itself.
III.

THE PROMULGATION

OF THE NATURAL

LAW

of promulgation has an important place in law. We can
scarcely expect a man to be bound by a law if he has no way of knowing
of it; such a law is no law at all. The principle that law should be promulgated
is a commonplace of the law, and jurists do not dispute it. Modem legislation
under the continental systems fixes carefully the conditions for promulgation.
An official gazette is provided for, and a law takes effect only when it has
been published there. Common law jurists have paid less attention to the
subject of promulgation, but would not deny the basic principle.
But no manner of promulgation will make the well-known principle that
"everyone is presumed to know the law" anything but a fiction. Even if we
have an official gazette, most citizens will not read it.
Obviously everyone cannot know the whole law; but the law should
be accessible. When a citizen needs to know the law on a given point, it
should be possible for him to find it out. If I want to make a will, I can
and should find out how to make it validly; and if I wish to drive a car,
I can and should learn something of the traffic regulations. When we say
that everyone is presumed to know the law, we mean that the law is thus
accessible, and that a person affected ought to consult it.
Here I speak of particular dispositions of law rather than of law as a
whole. It is the jurists, men who deal with positive law, who have brought
out the necessity and importance of promulgation. But is there any proTHE QUESTION
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mulgation of the natural law, or can there be a juridical natural law in
the absence of such promulgation?
We can best approach this question, it seems to me, by beginning with
the definition of a law given by St. Thomas Aquinas. His system is, to be
sure, a theologico-philosophical one; but it does not ignore mundane realities.
We shall discover a characteristic example of this in the present case.
When at the beginning of his Treatise on Laws St. Thomas gives a definition he borrows it from Roman law, which he knows through the canonists.
Here is his definition, only a part of which concerns us at the moment, but
which is good to have in its entirety because we shall have to examine other
aspects of it later on. A law is by this definition "an ordinance of reason
directed at common good, established and promulgated by competent
2
authority."
For a law to be a law, then, it must be promulgated. Next St. Thomas
defines the different kinds of law and seeks to determine what constitutes
promulgation for each. He begins with divine law, which is divine thought
as God knows it, and is at the origin of everything; he goes on to discuss
natural law, and comes finally to positive divine law and positive human law.
Now the general definition of law which he gives to begin with is inspired
by positive human law. We call positive law a law which springs from the
will of a person called a lawgiver. It is truly an ordinance of reason, as
St..Thomas says, but not a necessary one. Positive law intervenes when reason
offers a choice between several alternative solutions. For example, reason
offers a choice between freedom of testamentary disposition as it exists in
Anglo-Saxon law, and the system of reserve as it exists in Continental
European law. What makes one of these systems operative in a given country
is the will of the lawgiver.
When it is a matter of divine law and of natural law, however, the
problem is entirely different, since these are laws which are not only a work
of reason but also govern reason-man's reason in any case; we shall not
take up here the question of. whether and in what manner these laws are
binding on God. The promulgation of a provision of the natural law, and
therefore of the whole natural law, presents a question entirely different
from that of the promulgation of the positive law;
Let us again recall that in his. definition of law St. Thomas. draws his
inspiration indirectly from Roman law and directly from the canonists,
who themselves followed Roman law. Canon law is the very type of positive law, perhaps the purest in existence.
2.
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We have already noted how law and morality are constantly interwoven.
Necessarily, jurists are often concerned with moral questions. As they do
not like to be subject to the moralists, however, they often refuse to admit
that these are moral questions, but call them by some other name. Thus it
is that many French jurists--they are the ones I know best-speak of "equity"
as if it were a concept specifically juridical and quite different from what
the moralists call justice. Attitudes like this are manifestations of the same
professional provincialism I have already discussed; they often obscure what
might otherwise be clear.
The interpenetration of law and morality is not the same problem for
the canonists that it is for other jurists, since the Church, unlike the state,
works out and inculcates its moral commitment primarily through instrumentalities other than law. This security enables the canonist to approach
matters of merely ecclesiastical disposition in an atmosphere of insulation
from moral concern. It is true that the rules of the canon law are established
so that Christians may practice their religion at least to a minimal extent;
but these rules provide as they do solely because of the will of the legislator.
The obligation to go to Mass on Sunday is an example. The Catholic is
under a general moral obligation to attend Mass from time to time, not
necessarily every week, and not necessarily on Sunday, although some preference should perhaps be given to that day. But the strict and carefully
delimited obligation to go every Sunday, which can be fulfilled on no other
day, and in no other way than by physical presence, is an example of pure
positive law. The only justification we can give for it is that the legislator
wanted it that way. Morality may pose numerous questions concerning this
canonical obligation, but the obligation itself is purely juridical, as much
so as any example we could find.
Now it is from this context that St. Thomas takes the inspiration for
his definition of law with its requirement of promulgation. How can such
a definition apply to natural law?
Since St. Thomas includes the principle of promulgation in his definition
of law, the natural law must be promulgated. Clearly, it cannot be like
a human law read off to the sound of trumpets or printed in an official
gazette. For St. Thomas, natural law is that- part of the divine law which
man knows naturally. Its place in the human consciousness is such that its
first principles cannot be effaced. By his God-given nature man has an
immediate cognizance of the first principles of action, as he does of the first
principles of knowledge.
But as to the extent of this immediate cognizance, St. Thomas is cautious.
In a very significant passage he says: "as to general principles, the natural

JACQUES LECLERCQ
law cannot in any way be effaced from the hearts of men at least in its
general tenor."'3 We can see how he emphasizes the idea that this immediate cognizance applies only to the most general principles. His followers
have displayed less caution.
We must remember, however, that when St. Thomas speaks of the
promulgation of the natural law he is not particularly concerned with juridical law. When he deals with natural law his interest is chiefly in the
first principles of action-that is, of morality. On the other hand, when
he approaches positive human law, he sees it dearly as juridical law, and
does not seem to be aware of any shift in his thinking. The difficulty of
applying to St. Thomas' nonjuridical natural law the general definition of
law of which the requirement of promulgation is a part-a jurist's definition
as we have seen-is particularly apparent when we consider another point
of the same definition: the requirement that a law be "directed at the
common good." The common good is a concept in social philosophy; it
cannot be inherently the object of the moral law. When I ask myself what
I ought to do--the fundamental question of morality-I do not have to
refer to the common good except in considering the possible repercussions
of the action I contemplate. This consideration, even when it becomes important, is not part of the essence of a moral question; there would still
be a moral question without it.
All this highlights the importance of what has been suggested earlier:
that we should distinguish between what is of juridical nature in the natural
law and the moral law and what is not. But if natural law is of juridical
nature, does it not haveto be promulgated, since promulgation is itself one
of the necessary characteristics of juridical law? Again we must ask, how

can it be promulgated?,
For St. Thomas the question is not difficult, since his synthesis of thought
rests upon God,,and God as he conceives Him is the Christian God, the
Creator, Providence, the Father. God, in the Christian conception, is a
Being eminently active; He governs all; He intervenes constantly. The
cognitions upon which human action rests are in man because God wills it;
they are in some manner infused in man by God. It is the same with the

natural law. The promulgation of the natural law is accomplished by God
within man's consciousness. We have thus a legislator and true promulgation.
We have seen, however, that the jurists do not much care for this
interpretation., In the first issue of this FORUM, Professor d'Entrtves remarks
that the Thomistic idea of the natural.law is difficult to accept nowadays,
3.

Id., q. 94,.art. -6.
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because jurists do not like to refer constantly to a philosophical synthesis
in which God is made to intervene whenever a law is to be established.
I believe that we should go further: this may be especially true of our

contemporaries, but jurists have never liked this sort of constant mingling,
because as we have seen, their deliberations concerning the positive law
require full-time activity and reflection, which they wish to engage in without
the distraction of continually recurring philosophical questions. They have
the impression that philosophers argue endlessly; they therefore wish to have
a juridical natural law beyond the reach of such arguments which they can
use as a point of departure. Philosophers find this attitude a bit brusque;
but jurists are practitioners, and this is a practical attitude.
But if this natural law is a postulate and does not bear discussion, how
can it be promulgated without divine intervention?
This question forces us to reflect more deeply on the very idea of promulgation. We have already observed that promulgation requires not that all
men in fact know all laws, but that they be able to know them. Actually,
no system of law is explicitly published in its entirety. Indeed, in one such
system, the most fundamental rules are not promulgated, in the sense in
which legislative enactments are promulgated. I am alluding here to the
customary law which is found in the common law of Anglo-Saxon countries.
In the countries of Continental Europe, this idea of customary law has passed
into the background with the introduction of the Codes, and the establishment of a legislative power whose business it is to make laws. From this
comes a tendency to take for granted the idea that there is no law except when
the governing power intervenes to establish it. But the law is not thus
limited.
In the early conception of law, which has persisted in the common law
tradition, the power of the sovereign was one of announcing the law, something quite different from making law. The law was an a priori reality whose
origin no one discussed. When there was a private litigation concerning
the application of the law, the sovereign intervened to announce the applicable
law. In one sense the law was not promulgated. People had a confused idea
of what it was, and the intervention of the sovereign made this idea clearer.
The sovereign later delegated his powers to tribunals, but in principle it was
he who was charged with the mission of announcing the law.
The notion of the promulgation of law is not then as clear in practice
as it is in general formulation. Thus we come to feel that the situation of
the natural law is not very different from that of the positive law in this
regard. We are faced by a group of principles, some relating to natural
law, others to positive law, and all at the foundation of social life.
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Again we must distinguish between the principles of natural law and
those of positive law. The former are common to all men, because they
are to be found wherever human nature appears. The latter pertain to particular human traditions. To sharpen the distinction, it would be desirable
to have a science of natural law with a group of specialists entirely devoted
to it. As we have seen, there has hitherto been no such group, and the
obscurities which complicate the question arise in large part from this lack.
To illustrate what is involved here, let us consider the institution of marriage. If in our time we ask a. Latin what marriage is, he will be apt to
answer to the effect that marriage is the institution established by the civil
code, in such and such a title. But marriage certainly existed, and existed
as a legal institution, before there was a civil code. The civil code codified
the principles and may have modified some of them, but it did not create
marriage.
Marriage is a traditional institution found, with variations, among all
peoples., The question for the student of natural law is whether there are
certain conditions which so inhere in the nature of man that they must be
incorporated in any system of positive law if the institution of marriage is
to be intelligently established under it. But these conditions of the natural
order are not all the conditions necessary to the establishment of the institution within a given society. There are conditions peculiar to different
societies, and these are embodied in general. regulations of positive law the
forms of which are determined by tradition. For instance, the legal relations
between spouses are arranged differently in the Anglo-Saxon tradition than
in the Latin tradition. It is possible that the two traditions are equally
conformable to natural law. But how can we determine this without careful
study of the natural law?
This brings us back to the observation that natural law is in about the
same position as positive law as regards promulgation. The general principles
of the positive law are not usually promulgated in the precise sense of
promulgation by a lawmaker. In a properly organized society, however, there
will be a widespread knowledge of the general principles, and those charged
with seeing to the application of the law will have access to its particular
dispositions by means of study. Natural law, if it is to have binding force,
should be known or knowable in the same way. To admit that it is, we
do not need a philosophical synthesis which determines whether the knowledge of natural law is infused in man by God. A man may come to know
the natural requirements of social life whenever he reflects upon social life,
if he has favorable conditions, and a mind untroubled by prejudice, passion,
or an overriding interest in something else. But up to now not much has
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been done in this direction; this is why we have not witnessed the foundation of a science of natural law capable of producing useful results as well
as general statements.
IV.

SANCTION

IN

NATURAL

LAW

in characterizing law give an important place to sanction.
This notion is related to the one which places the origin of law in the command of the one to whom St. Thomas refers in general terms as "having
charge of the community," the Republic, the Prince, or the State, depending
on the fashion. The sanction of which the jurists speak is one fixed by the
law and given effect by such a ruler. This again creates a difficulty for the
natural law and a ground for its opponents to deny that it is law.
To explain the idea which jurists hold concerning sanction, it is necessary
to recall again what jurists are. The men thus named are those whose central
concern is with the courts-professors, lawyers, and judges. When we speak
of justice we are particularly concerned with the courts and with those who
share in their activity, in other words, with these men.
An outsider observing this group in operation is apt to be rather surprised. Since their function is limited to the application of law, he might
have supposed them to be of less importance to the legal system than those
who make law. But in our modern world law is made by legislatures whose
members are by no means all qualified as jurists. Indeed, jurists tend to
have a certain disdain for the members of the legislature and to reproach
them for not understanding the law.
The jurist is someone who applies the law and for this purpose seeks
to understand it. Since he is not creating the law, he takes it as given. His
work is built on this foundation.
Sanction consists of punishing what is against the law, and ignoring
social events with which the law does not expressly deal. This last is merely
another way of attempting to add force to the express rules of law. In the
atmosphere which prevails among jurists, one feels that the only social realities
are those regulated by law. One who has seen a little of the world of the
jurists- observes it to be a tightly dosed one. I remember certain English
novels which describe the Inns of Court; the "monde du Palais" of the Latin
countries is similar. Those who breathe this atmosphere believe that they
dominate society. Often they are aware of no social realities except the ones
which come before the courts.
In our day, however, this conception of law has waned under the influence of historical and sociological studies and of juridical developments which
MOST

JURISTS

JACQUES LECLERCQ
are foreign to civil law and transcend it. Whereas civil law takes up only
acts sanctioned by law, sanction does not play the same role in international
law and in public law. We realize that a rule of law can be sanctioned
only by virtue of another rule of law and that by working back one should
be able to arrive at a primary unsanctioned law. Thus, in public law we
always arrive at a primary rule which is not juridically sanctioned; thus,
also, we admit the existence of an international public law even in the
absence of any juridical sanction.
Also, the development of sociology has made us realize that even in civil
law sanction is limited by the state of public opinion. We apply laws only
insofar as public opinion permits-this is why there are unenforced laws
everywhere. Jurists have always been, at least unconsciously, subject to such
pressures, although until recently their writings did not give this impression.
Moreover, in many fields civil law incorporates general notions such as
"good morals," "public order," or "grave injury," the interpretation of which
depends on the state of public opinion. Thus, in Franco-Belgian law the
Napoleonic code established as a ground for divorce the adultery of the
husband aggravated by the keeping of his mistress in the matrimonial home,
whereas the wife's adultery was by itself a sufficient ground for divorce.
But elsewhere in the code "grave injury" was made a ground for divorce.
Times having changed, the courts came to regard the husband's adultery
as grave injury. Thus, simple adultery on the part of the husband came
to be visited with a sanction under the pressure of public opinion, without
any modification of the positive law.
Even if sanction is not a necessary element of law, we may say that the
legal system tends to develop it. If we were to personify the legal system we
might say that it aspired to sanction. Public law and international law
give good illustrations of this.
Ever since the advent of written constitutions in modern times, the earliest
example being that of the United States of America, the development of sanctions for political institutions has been one of the chief concerns of their
makers. Under older systems of government, the laws concerning the political
institutions were the basis for effectuating the sanctions of other laws, but
did not themselves carry a sanction. The innovation of providing sanctions
for laws of this sort shifts but does not eliminate the incidence of the
unsanctioned law. This innovation is nowhere more highly developed than
in the system of judicial review of legislative and executive acts as it exists
in the United States, but this system itself has no sanction other than public
opinion. It is a convention among those on whom it impinges that they
will be bound by its determinations. The contempt power, the ostensible
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sanction for judicial acts, could obviously make no more than a token
showing against determined opposition from the other branches of government. However far we go in constructing sanctions on our laws, we will
eventually come to a point where there is no sanction. Yet the impetus toward
sanction is always present.
International law provides an even more striking example. Humanity
in our time has arrived at a stage of civilization which makes both possible
and necessary the formation of a world society. All jurists agree that such
a society cannot be fully effective unless it has some form of sanction at
its disposal. Establishing a world society with effective sanctions is surely the
gravest problem of our day. It appears, then, that a law does not need
sanction to be law, but that it tends toward sanction as a condition of juridical
health. Something is lacking in a law with no sanction.
What is the situation with natural law? To begin with, it tends to the
sanction provided by the positive law, in that the prescriptions of natural
law should ideally be carried out by the positive law. But this does not resolve
the problem, because if positive law affords the only sanction for natural
law, the latter is then sanctioned only by something other than itself. If we
are to treat of natural law in itself we must find if there is a sanction proper
to natural law and sharing in its character.
Since the natural law is "natural," imposed upon man's activity, unlike
the positive law, which is "artificial," or a product of that activity, we must
seek the sanction for natural law in nature, which is its proper domain.
Is there a natural sanction for the natural law?
The answer is clear. Since natural law represents the social needs of
human nature, the social institutions violative of the natural law will not
bear the requisite fruits of human development. This abstract formula means,
concretely, that men will remain uncivilized and will not find happiness.
If, for example, political society is not organized according to the requirements of nature, it will not provide the citizen with the freedom and security
he needs. If the family is not organized according to the requirements of
nature, it will not play its proper role in the development of the human
personality.
Again, therefore, we find in the natural law the juridical character
which we have seen in it throughout these pages. Natural law consists of
objective rules for social organization-rules which morality tells us to follow.
V.

THE

CONCLUSION

to be derived from the foregoing discussion may be stated
in a few words. It is this: there is an important place for activities like the
CONCLUSION
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publication of the NATURAL LAW FORUM. A group of specialists working
wholeheartedly to determine the nature and scope of natural law in an
atmosphere untouched by political or social passion or prejudice will render
to humanity an invaluable service.
In these pages we have attempted to determine what natural law is.
This idea should furnish a point of departure for subsequent studies. Finding
what natural law involves and how positive law accords with it, and discerning
how natural law should be translated into positive law may provide subject
matter for numerous studies important to the progress of juridical thought.
In concluding this study, however, I ask myself if I am not crying in the
wilderness. No one seems to attach significance to a natural law which is
anything other than morality. This seems naive to me, but I fear that some
will regard my attitude as oversubtle or frivolous. But in my view the fact
that natural law has not had a deeper influence than it has until now stems
in part from the fact that we have accepted general statements without any
attempt to clarify them. Certainly, other factors are at work. There is no
necessary equation between clarity and influence; we see that in the field
of morality, for instance, great effort has been made to make the principles
as clear and precise as possible, but men still violate them. No one would
claim, however, that the effort was wasted.
If we were to devote ourselves to the natural law in itself and attempt
to clarify its requirements, working with the scientific spirit which is abroad
in all disciplines today and which does much to transform human thought
and activity, it seems clear that our efforts would contribute much to the
welfare of mankind. Such a new undertaking would require generations of
gradual development to come to fruition. But when we see the widespread
influence in our time of psychology and sociology, sciences with not even a
century of effective research behind them, we come to feel that many things
can gather force rather quickly. In our world, where we seek for international organization, and multiply meetings calculated to furnish common
bases for action, the meeting of a number of specialists dedicated to objective
research with only truth as their object would be a phenomenon of great
significance.
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